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BITCOIN AND THE BLOCKCHAIN AS POSSIBLE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TOOLS: STRENGTHS AND
WEAKNESSES
Fiammetta S. Piazza*
Bitcoin and similar virtual currencies are rapidly evolving and gaining traction in today’s economy.
However, legislators in the United States and abroad are still assessing the legal status of cryptocurrencies
and often pursuing quite different approaches in their regulation. On the other hand, the blockchain, the
technology underlying Bitcoin transactions, offers itself as a great tool that should be implemented in the
corporate governance field because of its recording certainty features. The blockchain, through the
distributed ledger, allows users within a network to perform peer-to-peer digital transactions while accessing
and monitoring changes in the ledger as they occur. The ledger also offers an opportunity to maintain
information securely, by encrypting and allowing access only to holders of cryptographic “keys”.
Because of its lack of a centralized issuer and absence of securities deriving from a national apparatus and
definite legislation, Bitcoin presents a series of uncertainties that prevent implementation as a corporate
governance tool. Instead, the blockchain’s capacity to maintain confidential information securely, such as
corporate strategies to be voted on by a board of directors or shareholders, within a network of allowed
users and to record transactions or events with certainty should be explored and implemented in the
corporate field. This article analyzes the current legal status of Bitcoin and blockchain technology; the
relationship between the two; and advantages and disadvantages of implementing either or both
technologies for transparency of ownership, corporate voting, accounting, and self-executing, “smart”,
contracts purposes. This article suggests that while neither should be implemented for accounting and
ownership reporting purposes, blockchain could prove a useful tool for corporate voting.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
* Fiammetta S. Piazza, J.D. Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, Class of
2017; J.D., Bocconi University, Italy, Class of 2012; LL.M., UCLA School of Law,
Class of 2013. Starting November 2017, Ms. Piazza will be an associate in the
business department of Polsinelli LLP, Los Angeles office. Ms. Piazza started
researching Bitcoin and blockchain as part of her law review note research while at
Loyola. The peculiar nature of Bitcoin and its sudden raise caught her attention
especially because she noticed the lack of legal certainty around cryptocurrencies.
The author has recently published an article on the matter: Bitcoin in the Dark Web:
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid evolution of the Internet and the transition to
the Web of a diverse array of infrastructure and systems, virtual
currencies have quickly developed. Today, virtual currencies play a
key role in the transformational change affecting the world economy,
reflecting the expanded venues available to consumers to access
goods and services.1 Indeed, unlike traditional currencies, virtual
currencies offer a peer-to-peer exchange mechanism eliminating the
need for intermediaries and central clearinghouses.2
While virtual currencies are not afforded legal tender, they may
still have equivalent traditional currency value.3 Within this category,
Bitcoin has developed and attained primary market status among
virtual currencies that can be exchanged for traditional currencies.4
Bitcoin’s main feature is the so-called blockchain: a ledger where the
parties to each transaction report their exchange. Accordingly, while
the features and characteristics of each Bitcoin exchange may vary
tremendously, it is possible, within the exchange and with the
necessary access authorization, if any, to monitor transactions.
However, this does not translate in complete transparency because
some exchanges permit users to create anonymous accounts. While
this is no longer possible in the United States following the recent
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) guideline
making it clear the Banking Secrecy Act applies to Bitcoin even
though it has not been recognized as currency, anonymous foreign
exchanges may still impact American corporate governance because
of the global nature of today’s economy and the ease of access to
those foreign exchanges.5

International Monetary Fund, Virtual Currencies and Beyond Virtual
Currencies
and
Beyond:
Initial
Considerations,
5,
available
at
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1603.pdf.
2 Id.
3 Sarah J. Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Feature, Advancing a
Framework for Regulating Cryptocurrenciy Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. REG. 495,
504 (2015).
4 Id.
5 Dep’t of the Treasury Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Guidance
Paper FIN-2013-G001, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons
1
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Section II of this paper discusses, in subsection A, the general
realm of virtual currencies and Bitcoin’s supremacy. Subsection B
distinguishes between Bitcoin, blockchain technology, and distributed
ledgers. Subsection C analyzes the mechanics of Bitcoin’s
transactions on the blockchain. Lastly, subsection D, surveys the
current regulatory framework regarding Bitcoin in the United States.
Section III examines the consequences of implementing
Bitcoin or the blockchain in the governance of companies.
Specifically it examines the potential benefits and disadvantages of
both as tools to enhance transparency, conduct corporate voting and
accounting, and enter “smart contracts.” Ultimately, this paper
suggests implementation of blockchain, but not of Bitcoin, may be
viable in some of those areas.
II. VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, BITCOIN, AND THE BLOCKCHAIN
A. Virtual Currencies and Bitcoin: Evolution and Problems
Satoshi Nakamoto – an alias6 – has long been thought to be
the creator of Bitcoin when a technical paper was posted on the

Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies (2013) available at
https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf.
6 While Bitcoin has developed since Nakamoto first published its
protocol, the true identity of its designer (or designers) is still unknown. After
posting the protocol, Nakamoto, other than for a few messages, has disappeared
and, in his words, “[has] moved on to other things.” Who is Satoshi Nakamoto?, THE
ECONOMIST
(Nov.
2,
2015
23:27)
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/11/economistexplains-1 (discussing how, among other things, Nakamoto’s own funds have
remained untouched). Several individuals and agencies, spanning from John Nash
to the NSA, have been thought to be the “face” behind the Nakamoto mask, but
no ultimate finding has been made. See, e.g. Justin OConnell, 10 People who have been
Called the Inventor of Bitcoin, Satoshi Nakamoto, CRIPTOCOINSNEWS (Aug. 21,
2015), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/called-the-inventor-of-bitcoin-satoshinakamoto/ (discussing the ten people who have been thought to be the inventor).
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Internet describing the protocol in 2008.7 However, recent
developments around the identity of Bitcoin’s creator identify in
Craig Wright the true “father” of Bitcoin. 8 Regardless of the identity
behind Bitcoin, the protocol was first implemented in 2009 and, since
then, several versions of the cryptocurrency have been created and
are easily available for download.9
Before explaining the functioning of Bitcoin and its role in
today’s economy, it is helpful to remember that traditional currencies
are defined as a system of money used and generally accepted in a
country (or union of countries as in the European Union’s eurozone)
as a form of payment.10 Traditional currencies are also known as fiat
currencies from the Latin term fiat meaning “let it be done” or “so it
shall be” in the sense of a governmental decree or order. This is so
because, different from commodity-based money like gold, silver or
copper-backed coins, fiat currencies do not have an intrinsic value.
Instead, the national government, as issuer, declares its value as legal
tender and, in the words of Milton Friedman, “[t]he pieces of green
paper have value because everybody thinks they have value.
Everybody thinks they have value because in his experience they have
had value.”11 Indeed, fiat currencies are part of multi-layer national
infrastructure inclusive of a national bank or system of banks (e.g. the
United States Federal Reserve) and an agency or department

7 P. CARL MULLAN, THE DIGITAL CURRENCY CHALLEGE –
SHAPING ONLINE PAYMENT SYSTEMS THROUGH U.S. FINANCIAL
REGULATIONS 85 (Palgrave MacMillan eds., 1st ed. 2014).
8 Following years of speculation, Australian Craig Wright has come
forward claiming to be the original creator of Bitcoin. As proof, he “digitally signed
messages using cryptographic keys created during the early days of Bitcoin’s
development. They keys are inextricably linked to blocks of bitcoins known to have
been created or ‘mined’ by Satoshi Nakamoto.” Australian Craig Wright Claims to be
Bitcoin Creator, BBC.COM (May 2, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology36168863.
9 MULLAN, supra note 7, at 86.
10 Article, Ralph E. McKinney Jr. et al., The Evolution of Financial
Instruments and the Legal Protection against Counterfeiting: A Look at Coin, Paper, and
Virtual Currencies, 2015 U. Ill. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 273, 274.
11 MILTON
FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO
CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 249 (1980).
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entrusted with the production of currency (e.g., the United States
Department of the Treasury Bureau of Engraving and Printing.) 12
A virtual currency is a “medium of exchange existing entirely
in intangible form that is not legal tender but which can substitute for
legal tender.”13 Within the broader category of virtual currencies
often used for online games and social media are cryptocurrencies,
Bitcoin being the most popular example.14 Cryprotcurrencies are
distinguishable from other virtual currencies in that theyare “internetbased virtual currenc[ies] in which the ownership of a particular unit
of value is validated using cryptography.” 15 Accordingly, Bitcoin is a
virtual currency with equivalent value in real currency but no legal
tender status, at least in most jurisdictions.16
The American Constitution reserves to the Federal
Government the power to coin money and regulate its value.17
However, laws prohibiting the circulation and use of unauthorized
instruments meant as currency or generally means of payment, have
not been interpreted to prohibit new types of money.18 Instead, these
laws have been applied for prosecuting counterfeited US dollar bills
and coins.19 Nonetheless, many countries have taken a direct stance
and have explicitly ruled that Bitcoin cannot be used as legal tender
within their borders.20 Even so, private parties can agree, in contract,
to use Bitcoin as method of payment for their transactions. Thus, the

Id. at 277.
Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 3, at 504.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 In Re Coinflip, Inc. et al., CFTC Docket No. 15-29 (CFTC Filed Sept. 17,
2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf.
17 U.S. Const. art. I, §8(5).
18 U.S.C. §336.
19 Julie Andersen Hill, Virtual Currencies & Federal Law, J.
CONSUMER & COMM. L., 49 (2015).
20 European Central Bank, Virtual Currency Schemes – A Further Analysis,
24 (2015),
available
at
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemesen.pdf.
12
13
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biggest hurdles Bitcoin faces are volatility and absence of a
supporting institutional infrastructure.21
Between March and April 2013, “Bitcoin’s dollar exchange
rose from about $50 to $350 and then fell back to near $70. Bitcoin’s
price rose even more sharply during the fall of 2013, rising from near
$50 in September to more than $110 by early December. During
2014, Bitcoin’s price showed large day-to-day variations but generally
trended down. By mid-January 2015, a Bitcoin was priced near
$200”22 then, as of July 2015, Bitcoin was trading at an exchange rate
of $279.32 per Bitcoin.23 However, it should be noted that Bitcoin’s
volatility has been declining steadily and Bitcoin has maintained lower
levels of volalititly compared to unstable reserve currencies like the
Russian Ruble and the Brazilian Real.24 Specifically, Bitcoin’s volatility
between March and May 2016 has been about 1.23% and around
1.45% between April and May 2016.25 For comparison, and to better
grasp Bitcoin’s level of risk, volatility of gold averages at around
1.2%, while major currencies average between 0.5% and 1.0%.26
Furthermore, “while gold has decreased by around 11% amid the
[F]ederal [R]eserve’s announcement of new interest rates
implementation, the price of [B]itcoin has increased to around
US$430.”27 In 2017, in the midst of uncertainties surrounding what
Since most countries have abandoned the gold standard – the
guarantee that anyone could trade a country’s currency in return for equivalent
amount of gold – the value of national currencies derives from social acceptance,
trust, and confidence in that country’s economy. The Global Monetary System – Not
Floating,
but
Flailing,
THE
ECONOMIST
(July
5,
2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21606322-after-150years-monetary-experimentation-world-remains-unsure-how.
22 Craig K. Elwell, M. Maureen Murphy & Michael V. Seitzinger, Bitcoin:
Questions, Answers and Analysis of Legal Issues, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE
REPORT,
7
(Jan.
28,
2015)
(available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43339.pdf).
23 Id.
24 Joseph Young, Volatility of Bitcoin Price Consistently Declined since 2010,
BITCOIN
NEWS
SERVICE
(Jan.
3,
2016,
4:00
PM),
http://www.newsbtc.com/2016/01/03/volatility-of-bitcoin-price-consistentlydeclined-since-2010/.
25 The
Bitcoin
Volatility
Index,
BITCOIN
VOLATILITY,
https://btcvol.info/.
26 Id.
27 Young, supra note 24.
21
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policies will be implemented regarding Bitcoin by the new
administration, “the cryptocurrency rose 3.1% to $1,164.10
. . .topping the all-time closing high of $1,137 set in November
2013.”28 February 2017, as a response to the newly inaugurated
presidential administration, has indeed marked the longest Bitcoin
has traded at over $1,000.29 This is because commentators expect
“the Trump administration to be at least more accepting of the
cryptocurrencies, even if they will not necessarily embrace them.” 30
This stems, at least in part, from the fact that Trump’s transition
team includes “Bitcoin supporters” like Peter Thiel, co-founder of
PayPal and investor in several Bitcoin companies, and Mick
Mulvaney, an outspoken supporter of Bitcoin and founder of the
bipartisan Blockchain caucus.31 Mulvaney, Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, has created the bipartisan caucus aimed at
educating Congress about Bitcoin and blockchain technology. 32 This
is a significant step, regardless of political views, to foster regulation
and thus certainty around cryptocurrencies and blockchain
technology. Mulvaney has also stated that “[b]lock chain technology
has the potential to revolutionize the financial services industry, the
United States economy and the delivery of government services, and
I am proud to be involved with this initiative.”33
Hypothetically, and national debates aside, if Bitcoin’s
acceptance becomes more widespread, its volatility may decrease and
this, in turn, may result in increased global acceptance of Bitcoin as a
28 Olga Kharif, Bitcoin Price Sets Record on Trump Policy Uncertainties,
BLOOMBERG
(Feb.
23,
2017
10:35
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-23/bitcoin-price-setsintraday-record-on-trump-policy-uncertainties.
29 Charles Bovaird, Bitcoin Price Tops $1,000 for Longest Stretch in History,
COINDESK (Feb. 21, 2017 20:32), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-price-tops1000-longest-stretch-history/.
30 Neha Thakur, Will Trump and Bitcoin be Good Partners, NEWSBTC (Jan.
23, 2017 9:35 AM), http://www.newsbtc.com/2017/01/23/will-trump-andbitcoin-be-good-partners/.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Shivdeep Dhaliwal, Donald Trump Inauguration Special: Make Bitcoin Great
Again!,
THE
COINTELEGRAPH
(Jan.
20,
2017),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/donald-trump-inauguration-special-makebitcoin-great-again.
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means of exchange. 34 However, without a national infrastructure
backing the virtual currency, Bitcoin’s success can merely be
temporary as in the case of mortgage-backed securities and other
financial instruments in the past.35 Indeed, it has been argued that
Bitcoin may become the subject of a financial bubble as it “seems to
fit the basic definition of speculative bubble – that is, a special kind
of fad, a mania for holding an asset in expectation of its
appreciation.”36 News regarding price increases both publicize and
amplify bubbles’ effects.37 They often justify the current bubble
phenomenon by attributing it to an inspiring “new era” story aimed
at attracting more attention as the prices rise. 38 In Bitcoin’s case, the
narrative was that “a computer whiz invented a new kind of money
in the form of electronic currency units, as part of decentralized
computer-driven system for a world economy that extends beyond
the reach of any single government.”39 Indeed, commentators have
speculated Bitcoin has already been the subject of a bubble in China
in 2013.40 There, the Government has issued laws both banning the
use of Bitcoin and prohibiting transfers out of the country of
currency in amounts higher than $50,000.41 Interestingly, on
November 3, the price of Bitcoin rose to its 2015 peak of US$377.36,
amounting to a 75% increase since August of that same year. 42
Supporting the speculation that Bitcoin was the subject of a Chinese
bubble, while the price rose globally, Chinese Bitcoin exchanges were

34 Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency
Regulation in the Bitcoin Age, (Aug. 22, 2014) (available at SSRN 2485550).
35 David Min, Understanding the Failure of Market Discipline, 43 (Mar. 3,
2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2403988).
36 Robert J. Shiller, In Search of a Stable Electronic Currency, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/business/in-search-of-astable-electronic-currency.html.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Anthony Cuthbertson, Bitcoin Price Hits 2015 Peak Amid Speculation of
‘Second Bitcoin Bubble’,
INT’L
BUS.
TIMES
(Nov.
2,
2015),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/bitcoin-price-hits-2015-peak-amid-speculation-secondbitcoin-bubble-1526956.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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trading the virtual currency at leading prices, “sometimes trading at
$10/bitcoin higher” than other exchanges world wide. 43
Historically, national central banks have been entrusted with
the mandate of protecting their national currency by “seeking to
match the supply of money to the needs of the economy and thus
maintain[ing] price stability.”44 This result is usually achieved by
attempting to make inflation rates as close as possible to set
benchmarks. Those benchmarks are usually low, as in the 2% target
of the United States, to avoid the uncertainty about the future and
the corrosive effects on currency value that would be caused by high
inflation. 45 In fact, trust that a national currency is a reliable store of
value derives from the confidence that the currency will be honored
at a value reflecting public expectations.46 Accordingly, be it directly
by setting interest rates,47 or indirectly by issuing public
communications “prepared for the purpose of shaping economic and
monetary conditions prospectively, as instruments of persuasion,”
central banks play a pivotal role in managing currency stability.48
Bitcoin’s independence from countries’ currency systems has been
claimed to be its strength, however, while this may be somewhat true
for highly unstable economies, it is not an automatic conclusion for
more stable and confidence-inspiring ones. Indeed, regardless of the
actual level of a country’s economic stability, it does provide
consumers with an interface to relate to and that is neutral from
private interests. Distinguishably, Bitcoin’s anonymous creation and
the private ownership of all Bitcoin exchanges create a reality where

Id.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Why Does the
Federal Reserve Aim for 2 Percent Inflation Over Time?, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/economy_14400.htm. Similarly, in Europe,
the ECB has a targeted inflation rate below, but close to 2%. See ECB, Monetary
Policy, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/html/index.en.html.
45 Sarwat
Jahan, Inflation Targeting: Holding the Line, IMF,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/target.htm.
46 Hilary J. Allen, $ = € = Bitcoin?, (Aug. 13, 2015), Suffolk Law School
Research Paper No. 15-33, 15, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2645001.
47 Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS.
L. REV. 75, 77 (2011).
48 Douglas R. Holmes, Communicative Imperatives in Central Banks, 47
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 15, 17 (2014).
43
44
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Bitcoin stability depends on the interrelation of conflicting private
interests.
Interestingly, according to its own website, Bitcoin’s value
derives from the fact that it is “useful as a form of money.”49 This
circular reason strengthens the fear that while the public is currently
interested in purchasing Bitcoin because of trust in its development,
if this belief disappears no central bank or government can provide
support to users. A sudden end to the acceptance of Bitcoin as a
payment method would translate into chaotic erosion of its value
and, ultimately, Bitcoin would lose its status as currency.
The lack of a neutral institution devoted to price stability can
explain, at least in part, Bitcoin’s volatility and riskiness. In contrast
to public sovereigns, Bitcoin exchanges have a private corporate
nature and relatively easy access to bankruptcy procedures that could
leave subscribers, as creditors, unprotected to a higher degree than
they would be if a bank were to be insolvent. However, as mentioned
above, Bitcoin is an interesting alternative in unstable economies
where the national currency is completely distrusted. For example,
Argentina is increasingly gaining interest in Bitcoin.50 Nonetheless,
Bitcoin may not be the best option even in those economies. An
example of a more structured and more reliable alternative currency
is the Unified System for Regional Compensation (“SUCRE”). 51
SUCRE started as a virtual currency for transaction between Ecuador
and Venezuela. It was intended as a medium to replace the US dollar
as means of exchange in order to limit and decrease the US influence

Bitcoin, Why Do People Trust Bitcoin?, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#whydopeople-trust-bitcoin.
50 See J.M.P. Montevideo, Bitcoin in Argentina: If it can’t Make it there, THE
ECONOMIST
(June
12,
2014,
13:36),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/06/bitcoin-argentina;
Nathaniel Popper, Can Bitcoin Conquer Argentina?, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr,
29,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/magazine/how-bitcoin-isdisrupting-argentinas-economy.html?_r=0.
51 Mercedes Alvaro & Jeffrey T. Lewis, Who Needs Bitcoin? Venezuela has its
“Sucre”,
(Jan.
2,
2014
6:51
pm),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304202204579256062854362716
.
49
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and control over Latin American trade and, at the same time, increase
stability of those markets.52
While theoretically appealing, Bitcoin lacks the full faith and
credit that has allowed national currencies to successfully function
and resist crises.53 “No private issuer enjoys the same extent for its
markets, the same capacity to coerce demand for its liabilities, or the
same psychological association with confidence in society.”54 This is
not to say that currencies alternative to national fiat currencies cannot
successfully exist. However, it is of extreme importance that virtual
currencies, by nature, tend to be unstable and extremely sensitive to
new events requiring past commitments to be readjusted.55
Consider the fate of bank-issued money in the United States
prior to the establishment of the US dollar as the common currency.
Many state banks issued their own IOUs with nothing but their own
assets to back them. Predictably, they failed whenever too many
claimants sought to make good on their claims at the same time. This
follows from the hierarchy of finance and the fact that non-state
entities, by definition, have limited resources. Critically, their ability to
mobilize fresh resources may falter precisely when it is most needed,
namely in times of crisis.56
Accordingly, Bitcoin and other similar virtual currencies’ are
too unstable to implement an overreaching corporate governance
system like that applicable to companies. Doing so could potentially
expose shareholders to greater risks than traditional transactionrecording methods do without a countervailing benefit.

Id. See also generally, Caroline R. Hurtado, Note, Fiscal Policies as Decisive
Solutions for Troubled Economies: Differing Legislative Enactments in Argentina and Ecuador,
24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 391 (discussing the dollarization process
undergone Latin American countries to obviate to economic instability).
53 FELIX
MARTIN,
MONEY:
THE
UNAUTHORIZED
BIOGRAPHY, 75 (2014).
54 Id. at 114.
55 Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECO. 315, 322
(2013).
56 Id.
52
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B. Distinguishing Distributed Ledgers, Blockchain, and Bitcoin.
Blockchain and Bitcoin are too often incorrectly used
interchangeably because of the strong association between the two.
However, the blockchain is merely the technology through which
Bitcoin functions and making the distinction between the two is
fundamental to understanding the potential independent use in
corporate governance of the blockchain, but not of Bitcoin,
proposed by this paper.
The blockchain is a particular type of distributed ledger and
represents the technological evolution of a tool as old as commerce.57
Indeed, in ancient times transactions were recorded on papyrus and
paper, today, the same recording occurs in computerized form. 58
What distinguishes distributed ledgers from the traditional form of
recording is that, through algorithms, the ledgers can be
collaboratively created by all of those sharing it in a network
consisting of multiple sites, geographies, and institutions.59
Distributed ledgers allow all users within the network to access and
visualize changes to the ledger as they occur while maintain the
information safe from unauthorized access via cryptographic “keys”
and signatures, controlling users’ relative powers.60 Indeed,
underlying the distributed ledger technology lays the blockchain,
which accomplishes peer-to-peer digital cash transaction in Bitcoin,
or otherwise.61 This is further analyzed in the next subsection.
Distributed ledgers, as contrasted to Bitcoin, offer an
interesting tool to implement in corporate governance because of
their potential positive effect in at least some field of governance
which is discussed in Section III of this paper. Compared to current
data management methods, distributed ledgers offer a more secure
alternative given their resistibility to hacks. Unlike centralized
57 UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC
ADVISOR,
Distributed
Ledger
Technology:
Beyond
Block
Chain,
5,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/492972/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-technology.pdf.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 See infra Subsection Section II-c.
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systems, a successful cyber-attack on a distributed ledger would have
to contextually target all shared copies.62 While not completely
immune from hacks, this technology is also resistant to unauthorized
changes or malicious tampering because users can immediately spot
those changes.63 The technology represents an opportunity for
evolution in various fields given its adaptability to various uses:
distributed ledgers are capable of applicability to most transactions
given their ability of “guaranteeing and tracking assets as they move
from one ledger to another.”64 Interestingly, various governments
globally, are already moving towards the implementation of
distributed ledger technologies paralleling the private corporate
world.65
C. Mechanics of Bitcoin Transactions on the Blockchain
Given Bitcoin’s nature, mathematical formulas and
cryptography respectively control its issuance and use. 66 While users’
software store a public record of all transactions – the blockchain –
the actual identity of the transacting parties remains anonymous, as
no personal information is required to create an account on the
platform or exchange Bitcoins.67 Elimination of a third party
intermediary, such as a bank, ensures anonymity within Bitcoin
transactions.68 Anonymity is furthered by the absence of reporting
UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC
ADVISOR, supra note 57, at 6.
63 Id.
64 Money
with
no
Middleman,
THE
ECONOMIST,
http://www.economistinsights.com/technology-innovation/analysis/money-nomiddleman/tab/1, (last visited May 10, 2016).
65 UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC
ADVISOR, supra note 57. Five countries (United Kingdom, Estonia, Israel, New
Zealand, and South Korea, have also created a network of digitally advanced
government with the goal of strengthening the digital economy. See UNITED
KINGDOM CABINET OFFICE AND GOVERNMENTAL DIGITAL
SERVICE, D5 London: About D5 Member Countries, (Dec. 9, 2014),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/d5-london-about-d5-member-countries.
66 MULLAN, supra note 7, at 86-87.
67 Id. (noting that Bitcoin’s issuance is capped at 21M units).
68 Federal Reserve Board, Bitcoin: Technical Background and Data Analysis, 5
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2014/files/2014104pap.pdf.
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requirements and regulatory agencies, such as central banks and
taxing authorities.
In the absence of a third party clearinghouse, participants are
free, but not bound, to voluntarily record each transaction on the
blockchain.69 However, the effectiveness of this recording method is
disputable: users who record their transactions are rewarded with
newly minted Bitcoins.70 Conversely, no penalty follows from failure
to record. 71 This incentive-based policy explains, at least in part, the
steady growth of Bitcoin systems.72
The blockchain is comprised of a series of transactions each
consisting in a “block”.73 Each block indicates the asset and
consideration exchanged, the time of the transfer, and the identity (or
at least the pseudonym) of the transacting parties.74 Each block is
“chained” to the preceding and the subsequent one through headers
that report information (using codes) regarding the content of the
previous transaction block.75 Thus, through the codes reported in
each block’s header one can retrieve the preceding transaction block
and so on until the original transaction is reached.76 However, while it
is possible to trace Bitcoin transactions back to the original
acquisition of assets, depending on the type of exchange used, it is
potentially impossible to trace the transaction back to individuals. 77
Furthermore, depending on the visibility options set by the exchange,
blockchain records may be publicly visible or restricted to authorized
users and subscribers only.78 In the alternative, an intermediate
solution has developed whereby a company uses a private blockchain
accessible to authorized users only to record its daily transactions but
then periodically updates and reports an aggregate version of those
Id.
Id. (explaining that minting refers to the creation of new Bitcoins).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 PAOLO TASCA, Digital Currencies: Principles, Trends, Opportunities and
Risks,
Deutche
Bundesbank
research
report
(2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657598.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
69
70
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transactions on a publicly accessible blockchain. 79 This intermediate
solution is called, given its mechanics, a side chain.80
Regardless of the accessibility options, to execute a
transaction, both a private and a public key are necessary.81 Each
party to the transaction has a private encryption key that provides
access to their personal account and that, when paired with the public
key, allows transactions to go through. 82 Specifically, a transaction
requires a “pair of interlocking encryption keys” acting as peer-topeer signatures.83 The use of digitally encrypted signatures to
authenticate transactions is threefold in that it ensures the
authentication, non-repudiation, and integrity of payment messages.84
Moreover, Bitcoin transactions are final and irreversible:
voluntary refunds are the only way to revert the effect of the
transfer.85 Because there is no administrator, no transaction can be
blocked or penalized.86 Furthermore, Bitcoin users have the option to
either keep a Bitcoin wallet (also called dark wallet when kept on dark
web87 exchanges), on their own or through third parties, or convert
the currency back to their local currency.88 The latter option may,
depending on the method used, entail a potential for identity

Id.
Id.
81 MULLAN supra note 7, at 86.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Federal Reserve Board, supra note 68, at 8.
85 MULLAN supra note 7, at 87.
86 Id.
87 The dark web is a layer of the web accessible only through specific
software and where users can maintain nearly absolute anonymity. Stuart Dredge,
What is Tor? A Beginner’s Guide to the Privacy Tool, THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 5, 2013
07:47
AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/05/torbeginners-guide-nsa-browser (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
88 Steve Kovach, What It’s Like Using an ATM that Automatically Turns
Your Cash into Real Bitcoins, BUSINESSINSIDER (Mar. 10, 2014 5:00 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-atm-2014-3 (on how to buy and cash
Bitcoin).
79
80
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discovery.89 Indeed, it should not come as a surprise that a commonly
heard phrase in the Bitcoin industry is “buyer beware.”90
As mentioned, Bitcoin further differs from traditional
currencies in that no central bank controls the amount of currency
available and no jurisdiction guarantees it.91 Instead, a mathematical
protocol with no central administrating or monitoring authority
generates the Bitcoin.92 Given its math-based issuance and incentivebased transaction recording, while Bitcoin’s current cap of $21M
should not be reached earlier than 2140, each Bitcoin unit can be
divided into fractional units thus enhancing the currency’s presence
and spread.93 The cap of Bitcoin availability tends to suggest a
commodity-like nature, which will be discussed more in depth in the
following section about Bitcoin regulation alternatives. However,
unlike traditional natural commodities, Bitcoin’s cap is only
mathematically enforced and thus easily transformable, which adds a
further layer of unique complexity.
Furthermore, software and services like TOR (necessary to
access the dark web), the “dark wallet” (Bitcoin wallets stored on the
dark web), and Bitcoin-laundering services which are intentionally
designed to obscure the source of a Bitcoin transaction, enhance
Bitcoin’s already anonymous character and further complicate
traceability.94 Indeed, in the case of laundering services, the chain of
transactions on the blockchain is obscured by “linking all transactions
in the same [B]itcoin address and sending them together in a way that
makes them look as if they were sent from another address.”95 Other
services pursuing the same goal instead “comingle” different series of
This paper does not go into detail as to Bitcoin use in the dark web but
suffices it to say that there Bitcoin’s anonymous features are extremely enhanced by
additional layers of encryption. Id.
90 MULLAN supra note 7, at 87.
91 FATF Report, Virtual Currencies Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT
Risks
(June
2014),
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-andpotential-aml-cft-risks.pdf.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 As mentioned above, use of Bitcoin in the dark web offers further
opportunities to avoid and evade regulation. Id.
95 Id.
89
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transactions, rendering the identification of the user to whom the
sender intended to direct the funds impossible.96
To further understand Bitcoin’s instability, it should be noted
that Bitcoin acceptance peaked in 2013 with over 64,000 businesses
around the globe accepting it as form of payment. 97 However even
lucrative businesses suffer from this instability, for example Mt. Gox,
the largest Bitcoin exchange, filed for bankruptcy in 2014, after
Bitcoin valued at around US$500 million mysteriously disappeared.98
This example, considering the anonymous features of the currency,
illustrates the great volatility and risks associated with the trading of
Bitcoins.
Enforcement agencies picked up on Bitcoin early, and,
relatively soon after its creation, the FinCEN intervened issuing an
interpretative guidance which is discussed in the next subsection.
D. Current Regulatory Framework for Bitcoin in the United States
Similarly to other virtual currencies, no Bitcoin-specific
regulation has been enacted, nor does this paper suggest that it is
necessary. However, a definitive categorization of Bitcoin as a
specific financial instrument is necessary for market confidence in
terms of legal certainty and clarity regarding applicable statutes and
regulations. Indeed, while this article focuses on the dichotomy of
Bitcoin and blockchain technology as potential corporate governance
tools, it is important to understand that depending on the definition
of Bitcoin as a certain financial instrument or another, its regulation
may change considerably. Specifically, depending on the path
followed, Bitcoin may function as a reliable governance tool. While
legislatures are globally moving towards regulating Bitcoin use and
exchange, regulation is not uniform as countries are following
different approaches.
This article suggests that, notwithstanding what the applicable
regulation is, Bitcoin is not a suitable corporate governance tool
96
97
98

Id.
Federal Reserve Board, supra note 68, at 5.
Id. at 2.
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because of externalities that render the virtual currency unstable and
unreliable. However, to overview the current regulatory framework in
the United States is helpful in understanding how unripe the legal
system is to accept Bitcoin as corporate governance tool. Instead, this
article suggests that, for at least certain aspects of corporate
governance, distributed blockchain ledgers may represent a feasible
and practical tool as discussed below in Section III.
Given the lack of a universal definition of Bitcoin, its status
and consequent regulation greatly differs depending on whether it is
categorized as a form of money, a security, or a commodity. 99
1.

Current Applicable Law

FinCEN has clarified in its 2013 guideline that, because of
their anonymous features, Bitcoin users and exchangers are subject to
the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”).100 Specifically, the guideline clearly
states the BSA applies “to persons creating, obtaining, distributing,
exchanging, accepting, or transmitting virtual currencies”, but does
not go as far as classifying Bitcoin’s status. 101 Pursuant to the BSA, a
“money transmission service” is a two-step service of “acceptance of
currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency from one
person and the transmission of currency, funds, or other value that
substitutes currency to another location or person by any means.”102
Following the FinCEN 2013 guideline, Bitcoin administrators
and exchangers, in their capacity as Money Services Businesses
(“MSB”), must comply with the appropriate Treasury Department
registration process.103 Conversely, Bitcoin users do not fall within
the guideline MSB definition and are outside the Treasury
For further and deeper analysis of Bitcoin’s regulation see, Fiammetta S.
Piazza, Bitcoin in the the Dark Web: A Shadow over Banking Secrecy and a Call for Global
Response,
100 Guidance Paper FIN-2013-G001, supra note 5.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. (emphasis in original); Money Services Business (MSB) Registration,
FINCEN,
https://www.fincen.gov/financial_institutions/msb/msb.registration.html,
(last
accessed Feb. 5, 2016).
99
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Department scope of authority, at least for registration purposes. 104
The guideline also defines and clarifies that Money Transmitting
Services (“MTS”) are within the scope of the USA Patriot Act of
2001, which, among other addressed issues, imposes fines for, for
example, failure to register and obtain a Money Transmitter license.105
FinCEN’s conclusion that the BSA applies to Bitcoin
represents a major turn towards a thorough regulation of Bitcoin and,
by extension, of other similar cryptocrurrencies.
2.

Status as a Form of Money

“[Bitcoin] can be used to purchase goods or services, and
[. . .], to pay for individual living expenses.”106 Based on this
reasoning, a Texas District Court ruled on a matter of first instance
and held that “[i]t is clear that Bitcoin can be used as money.” 107
While relatively limited in terms of market acceptance, Bitcoin “can
also be exchanged for conventional currencies, such as the US dollar,
Euro, Yen, and Yuan.”108 Accordingly, the Texas court found that
“Bitcoin is a currency or form of money.” 109 The ruling is dated July
2013, only four months after FinCEN’s guideline publication.
While avant-garde and based on a sound reasoning, the Texas
court ruling should be carefully approached. Indeed, even though
Bitcoin is exchanged and used as money, unlike national currencies, it
lacks the support of a central authority like the United States
Treasury for the US dollar and it does not have intrinsic value, as do

Id.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot ACT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56.
106 Id.
107 SEC v. Shavers, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6,
2013). (Addressing the issue of whether jurisdiction under the Securities Acts of
1933 and 1934 applied to the facts of the case involving a Bitcoin Ponzi scheme).
108 Id.
109 Id. (The court’s ultimate finding was that investors wishing to invest in
BTCST provided an investment of money).
104
105
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commodities.110 Because of the differences between traditional
national currencies and Bitcoin, it has been argued that Bitcoin lacks
at least one of two required characteristics to be considered a true
currency.111 Specifically, although Bitcoin may be a means of
exchange it is not a store of value.112
Furthermore, in evaluating whether Bitcoin can be brought
within the definition of currency, it is of remarkable importance to
remember Bitcoin’s lack of national infrastructure, as opposed to fiat
currencies. Indeed, other than in exceptional cases, a national
currency can always be exchanged for and accepted as form of
payment. Instead, Bitcoin could vanish both because of the
combination of Bitcoin being the result of an Internet mathematical
protocol, the absence of a physical “paper-trail” backing up the
blockchain, and the Internet and computers being subject to
viruses.113
3.

Status as a Security

The issue of “whether the Bitcoin itself could be a security”
has yet to be addressed by a court.”114 Indeed, while Shavers
acknowledges it as an option, the court there did not delve into an
analysis of whether Bitcoin can be considered a security instrument.
The issue is even more intricate considering that, while there is
agreement regarding the fact that a security is, in economic terms, a
110 Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Bitcoin Is Evil, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 28,
2013), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/28/bitcoin-is-evil/?_r=0.
111 John Authers, Time to Take the Bitcoin Bubble Seriously, FIN. TIMES
(Dec.
11,
2013),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4ad1bba0-61fa-11e3-aa0200144feabdc0.html#axzz3sNu5guRP.
112 Id.
113 An example of a more structured and more reliable alternative
currency is the Unified System for Regional Compensation (SUCRE). SUCRE
started as a virtual currency for transaction between Ecuador and Venezuela and
was intended as a medium to replace the US dollar as means of exchange to limit
and decrease the US influence and control over Latin American trade and, at the
same time, increase stability of those markets. Alvaro & Lewis, supra note 51. See
also generally, Hurtado, supra note 52. (discussing the dollarization process
undergone Latin American countries to obviate to economic instability).
114 Daniela Sonderegger, Note, A Regulatory and Economic Perplexity: Bitcoin
Needs Just a Bit of Regulation, 47 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 195.
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form of investment, there is not a uniform definition. Instead,
different countries’ legal definitions vary, sometimes significantly,
covering a broad spectrum of alternatives. In the United States, the
Securities Act of 1933 comprehensively defines the term and
provides, in relevant part, that “security means any note, stock,
treasury, stock, security future, security-based swap, bond . . .,
investment contract . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a ‘security’. . . .”115
Over the years, American courts have developed and used the
Howey test to determine whether an interest is a security pursuant to
the Securities Act of 1933.116 In Howey, the court, beginning with a
textual analysis of the law, reasoned that the preliminary issue to
solve to understand what is a “security” is determining what is
intended by “investment contract.”117 Specifically, the Howey test
analyzes whether, at the time the interest is issued, the “investment
contract,” and consequently the security, is “a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise
and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or
a third party.”118 For purposes of applying the Howey test, whether
the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates, or by
nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise, is
irrelevant.119 However, Bitcoin’s analysis in light of the Howey test is
ineffective, at least in part because Bitcoin’s features do not suit
themselves.120 Specifically, while Bitcoin users may invest Bitcoin, the
cryptocurrency itself does not generally represent a share of a
common enterprise the investor believes will prove fruitful through
the efforts of a third party. Thus, although Bitcoin may be used as a

15 USCS § 77b.
SEC v. Howey Co., 293 U.S. 293.
117 Section 2 (1) of the Act defines the term “security” to include the
commonly known documents traded for speculation or investment. This definition
also includes “securities” of a more variable character, designated by such
descriptive terms as “certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement,” “investment contract” and “in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a ‘security.’” Id. at 297.
118 Id. at 298-299.
119 Id.
120 Sonderegger, supra note 114, at 195.
115
116
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security if the mentioned conditions are met, it remains unclear
whether it does, unequivocally, qualify as such.121
4.

Status as a Commodity

Classical political economy defines a commodity as product
or service produced by human labor and available for sale on the
market.122 Regardless of school of thought, it is generally agreed that
a commodity is a good, easily interchangeable with other
commodities of the same type also used in commerce.123 Indeed, an
essential characteristic of commodities is that their quality is
essentially uniform across producers and are uniquely fungible. 124
Specifically, to be commodities, goods must be: (1) standardized; (2)
usable upon delivery; (3) and their price must vary enough to justify
creating a market for the item.125 As an illustration, agricultural goods
like wheat, corn, oil, and coffee, energy-related goods like coal, oil,
and gas as well as precious metals like copper, silver, and gold are
typical commodities.126
Unlike the unexplored status as a security, the US
Commodity and Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) issuance of
its first action against an unregistered Bitcoin option-trading platform
in 2015, confirms that Bitcoin, and similar digital currencies, fall
within the definition of commodities and are thus subject to the
Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”).127 While the CFTC’s action
apperars to show a clear intent to regulate Bitcoin as a commodity, it
might be an effort to at least pose some restrictions and promote its
regulation.
Id. at 196.
KARL MARX, CAPITAL: VOLUME I 38 (Int’l Publishers, 1967).
123 Commodity,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commodity.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
124 Id.
125 Commodity,
INVESTING
ANSWERS,
http://www.investinganswers.com/financial-dictionary/commodities-preciousmetals/commodity-1035 (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
126 Commodity,
BUSINESS
DICTIONARY,
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/commodity.html (last visited Feb.
6, 2016).
127 In Re Coinflip, Inc. et al., supra note 16.
121
122
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It is important to note that, significantly differently from
traditional commodities, Bitcoin’s availability is potentially limitless.
However, taking into account Bitcoin’s potential status as a form of
money and its lack of an infrastructure typical of national currencies,
Bitcoin’s availability is limited. This is because of the long-standing
belief that currencies, typically currencies of countries possessing
significant quantities of commodities or other natural resources, have
been endorsed as commodities.128 Additionally, Bitcoin is notably
different from traditional commodities, as it is extremely volatile.129
For these reasons as well as Bitcoin’s virtual nature, leading to its
unknown supply because of its algorithmically coded scarcity and
future demand, some argue Bitcoin is more dissimilar to traditional
commodities than it is similar.130
In light of the general uncertainty surrounding Bitcoin, the
CFTC has clarified “commodity” as a term to be broadly construed
to include “all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”131 Regardless,
scholars are perplexed about the CFTC’s finding and suggest its
implications may shake Shaver’s holding that Bitcoin can be a
security.132 In the words of New York Law School Professor
Houman Shadab,”[t]he [CFTC order] puts to rest any notion that
virtual currencies qualify as securities. Otherwise, the Securities and
Exchange Commission would be bringing this action, not the
CFTC.”133 Unfortunately, no light is shed in the general gray fog
surrounding Bitcoin even in this context because neither the SEC nor
128 Brian
Perry, Forex Currencies: Commodity Pairs (USD/CAD,
USD/AUD,
USD/NZD),
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/forex-currencies/currencies8.asp
(last
visited Feb. 6, 2016).
129 Bitcoin’s volatility is further discussed in Section II-A of this article.
See supra p. 268. See, also, e.g., Young, supra note 24.
130 Danny Bradbury, Why Bitcoin’s Volatility is Unique among Commodities,
COINDESK (Apr. 29, 2014, 11:11 A.M.), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoinsvolatility-no-other/.
131 7 U.S.C. 1(a)(9). See, e.g., Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. SEC,
677 F. 2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1982).
132 Pete Rizzo, CFTC Ruling Defines Bitcoin and Digital Currencies as
Commodities, COINDESK (Sept. 17, 2015 22:06), http://www.coindesk.com/cftcruling-defines-bitcoin-and-digital-currencies-as-commodities/.
133 Id.
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the CFTC have issued any disclosures following issuance of the
CFTC order. Consequently, while it is undisputed that Bitcoin falls
within the scope of the definition of commodity, no final
determination can be made regarding its status as security.
5.

The Federal Reserve, the Internal Revenue Service, and Other
State and Federal Regulators

The Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet Yellen expressly
stated during testimony before the Senate Banking Committee that
the agency “doesn’t have authority to supervise or regulate Bitcoin in
any way.”134 This conclusion was heavily motivated by the absence of
a “central issuer or network operator,” which makes it “not easy to
regulate Bitcoin.” 135 The Chairwoman has not offered policy
guidance but has made clear that “[t]his is a payment innovation that
is taking place entirely outside the banking industry.”136
Taking a diametrically opposed approach, the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) has affirmed its authority over Bitcoin.
Specifically, the IRS has clarified that it treats Bitcoin like property
subject to property tax and that “sale or exchange of convertible
virtual currency, or the use of convertible virtual currency to pay for
goods or services in a real-world economy transaction, has tax
consequences that may result in a tax liability.” 137 As a means of
comparison, the United Kingdom has moved towards a
comprehensive regulation of Bitcoin. 138 The HM Revenue and
134 Ryan Tracy, Yellen: Bitcoin ‘Doesn’t Touch’ Banks the Fed Oversees, THE
WALL
STREET
J.
(Feb.
27,
2014
12:32
P.M.),
https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/no-headline-available-1393521584.
135 Charles Cooper, Fed Chief Yellen: No Power to Regulate Bitcoin, CNET
(Feb. 27, 2014 10:37 A.M.), https://www.cnet.com/news/fed-chief-yellen-nopower-to-regulate-bitcoin/.
136 Shelly Palmer, Bitcoin: Money, Currency or Something Else?, THE
HUFFINGTONPOST
(March
3,
2014
10:10
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shelly-palmer/bitcoin-money-currencyor_b_4889845.html.
137 IRS Notice 2014-21: Virtual Currency Notice at 1, March 25, 2014,
available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf.
138 Sarah Saunders, Cryptic Currency, TAXATION (March 11, 2015),
https://www.taxation.co.uk/Articles/2015/03/10/332784/cryptic-currency.
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Customs (“HMRC”) has issued a policy brief on the treatment of
income received from, and charges made in connection with,
activities involving Bitcoin and other similar cryptocurrencies, for:
Value Added Tax (“VAT”); corporation and income tax; and capital
gains purposes.139 While the country’s recent vote towards leaving
the European Union will have consequences over this issue,
currently, the tax treatment in the United Kingdom is as follows:
acquisitions by mining are considered outside the scope of VAT;
Bitcoin is considered a foreign currency for corporation and income
tax purposes; and gains or losses on Bitcoin are chargeable or
allowable for capital gains tax if they accrue to an individual and are
not covered by trading profit rules.140
Domestically, states have moved in the direction of regulating
Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies through license systems. For example,
New York has proposed a “BitLicense” regulation plan aimed at
“help[ing] protect consumers and root[ing] out illicit activity.”141 So
far, five more states – California, Colorado, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, and Texas – have also moved toward a similar and favorable
regulation of the Bitcoin. 142 Implementation of these systems of
regulation, offer the benefit of ease of enforcement and monitoring
because they offer the opportunity to conduct upfront investigation
of Bitcoin issuers and exchanges.143

Id.
HM Revenue & Customs, Revenue and Customs Brief 9 (2014):
Bitcoin
and
other
Cryptocurrencies
(March
3,
2014),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/revenue-and-customs-brief-92014-bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrencies/revenue-and-customs-brief-9-2014bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrencies.
141 Benjiamin M. Lawsky, Superintendent of Fin. Serv., Speech: NYFDS
Announces Final Bitlicense Framework for Regulating Digital Currency Firms
(June
3,
2015),
available
at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/speeches/sp1506031.htm (discussing 23 NYCRR
§200.1
et
seq.
available
at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/revised_vc_regulation.pdf).
142 For more detail as to the specific actions of those states, see Daniel
Cawrey, 5 US States Poised to Promote Bitcoin Friendly Regulation, COINDESK (Aug.
31, 2014 11:00), http://www.coindesk.com/5-us-states-poised-promote-bitcoinfriendly-regulation/.
143 Id.
139
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III. BLOCKCHAIN AND BITCOIN: POTENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION AS
NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TOOLS
This section analyzes the potential benefits and detriments
deriving from implementing Bitcoin together with or independently
from the blockchain technology in corporate governance. This paper
suggests that the present features of Bitcoin and its current underregulation do not necessitate its implementation because of the
extreme exposure to volatility risks and hacks. However, the paper
suggests the blockchain technology, as distinguished from Bitcoin,
may instead offer a viable tool in areas of corporate governance like
voting.
The following subsections explore the relative benefits and
disadvantages deriving from implementing Bitcoin or the blockchain
in the corporate governance of companies as tools for enhanced
transparency, voting, accounting, and self-executing contracts (smart
contracts).
A. Transparency of Ownership and Trading Value
Transparency and disclosure are at the base of good
corporate governance models in that they enable shareholders and
stockholders to make informed decisions and hold corporate
executives accountable, thus limiting the agency costs associated with
asymmetry of information.144 In line with this perspective, countries
globally have moved towards implementation of legislation aimed at
enhancing corporate disclosures in a broad attempt at curtailing a
greater role for shareholders in corporate governance.145

144 See, e.g., Benjiamin Fung, The Demand and Need for Transparency and
Disclosure in Corporate Governance, 2 UNIVERSAL J. MGMT 2, 72-80 (2014),
http://www.hrpub.org/download/20140105/UJM3-12101630.pdf.
145 For example, in the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
requires publicity of information including roles of and responsibilities of board
and management executives and the Williams Act of 1968 requires disclosures
regarding tender offers. Sarbanes-Oaxley Act of 2002, 107 P.L 204 (2002); Williams
Act, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 90 P.L. 439 (1968).
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Transparency can be considered to be based on five pillars:
(1) truthfulness, (2) completeness, (3) materiality of information, (4)
timeliness, and (5) accessibility.146 Implementing distributed ledgers as
a corporate governance tool could, at a minimum, result in enhanced
timeliness and accessibility of corporate information. Indeed, as
discussed in the previous section, users given access to the ledger
would be able to track changes in the ledger as they occur thus
allowing for timely transmission of information to shareholders.
Shared ledgers would also address the accessibility pillar of
transparency in that information stored on the ledgers would be
readily accessible to all authorized users. The use of shared ledgers
does not directly affect truthfulness and completeness of shared
information, however they would allow users to easily monitor
transactions as well as recognize possible breaches to the system.147
Conversely, the same result may not flow from using Bitcoin because
of its anonymous features as further discussed hereunder.
Accordingly, this paper suggests use of blockchain, but not Bitcoin,
in corporate transaction recording to foster enhanced transparency.
In the United States, Bitcoin is undergoing regulation and
exchangers are thus implementing amendments to their systems to
comply with the BSA and, consequently, certain minimum identity
requirements are now necessary for subscription as an exchange
user.148 However, it is not mandatory for companies wishing to use
Bitcoin in their governance to use local exchanges only. Indeed, just
like a company may have international shareholders, it may decide to
use an international Bitcoin exchange that allows reduced identity
checks. Accordingly, because local regulation of Bitcoin exchanges
are highly diverse in type and thoroughness, if any, using a foreign
blockchain may result in non-transparent ownership. This would be
so because of lack of disclosure requirements as well potential
anonymous accounts.
Use of local exchanges respecting the BSA could still not be
sufficient to ensure complete transparency of ownership. Possible
implementation of closed blockchains, accessible to authorized users

146
147
148

Fung, supra note 144, at 75-76.
See, supra, Section II-B, at 274.
See supra, Section II.
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only, or of side chains, would de facto frustrate the goal of inspiring
shareholders and investors’ trust in the company by way of allowing
transparent and easy access to ownership arrangements and
instantaneous changes thereof.
Assuming full transparency is implementable, it would have
remarkable effects on the behavior of players such as managers,
investors, and shareholder activists. Using executive compensation as
an illustration, this paper discusses the consequences of complete
transparency. Specifically, regardless of the driving forces producing
the final arrangement, managers’ compensation is often a
combination of salary and equity.149 Currently, public companies are
required to file with the SEC disclosures including executive
compensation, however those filings do not necessarily come in a
format easily comprehensible to non-sophisticated investors.150
Implementation of blockchain technology could render executive
compensation more easily traceable and quantifiable for lay investors
because of its user-friendly interface. Indeed, while theoretical
problems regarding whether executive compensation is optimal or
whether the specific boards are beholden to the executives in their
choices, complete transparency coupled with easier understanding
would at least allow shareholders real time monitoring. This would
enhance the shareholders’ role of serving as a check on both board
decisions, generally, and executive compensation, specifically.
Depending on the percentage distribution of each
component, managers’ incentives tend to flow towards, more or less,
shareholder-centered strategies. Indeed, acquisition and liquidation of
managers’ equity in the company have become of central importance,
especially after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.151
Among other things, the act has reduced filing periods for managers
to disclose their acquisition and disposition of company shares. 152
Indeed, while originally managers had to make such disclosures
149 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay without Performance: Overview of
the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 443 (2005).
150 See generally, Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ration Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html.
151 Sarbanes-Oaxley Act.
152 Id.
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within ten days from the acquisition of disposition, the SarbanesOxley Act has reduced this disclosure window to two business
days.153
While enhancing shareholders awareness, registration of
company shares on a public ledger could undercut the effectiveness
of equity-based compensation because trades observable in real time
would have a lower value to executives as they could lose trade
leverage or edge as a consequence.154 This might result in increased
salary-based compensation of executives given the loss of value of
their equity compensation.155 Furthermore, registration of shares on
the blockchain would also result in higher consciousness by
shareholders of when company shares are pledged as collateral for
loans or in connection with derivative hedging product.156 These
typical managerial moves may seem alarming to an inexperienced and
uninformed market observer even when fully sound according to
business judgment and could thus result in unwarranted market
drops. Accordingly, while registration on the blockchain and the
heightened transparency flowing from it can increase the role of
shareholders in the governance of companies, it may also result in
inefficiencies and obstacles in a board’s execution of its strategic and
managerial role within the company. 157
On the other hand, assuming full transparency is achieved by
implementing direct public blockchain systems, as opposed to side
chain, the positive effects of transparency could still be undermined if
Bitcoin is used. In fact, using Bitcoin to assess the value of
transactions, here of compensation, and given the volatile value of
Bitcoin, it would be quite possible to circumvent true reporting
simply by assessing the transaction during low Bitcoin value trading.
This would effectively enhance likelihood of circumvention of
accounting fraud and misreporting frustrating the purpose of
Id.
David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, (NYU Stern Sch.
of Bus. & Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w21802, 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2703207.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 See, id.; Jill E. Fish, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. R. 265,
272-275 (1997).
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154
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legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oaxley Act. Accordingly, while
intermediary fees usually associated with banking transactions may be
avoided, this would be at the cost of providing executives with an
additional method to circumvent honest accounting.
Lastly, regardless of the blockchain used (Bitcoin-based or
simple shared ledger) registering a company’s shares on the
blockchain, would possibly also translate into added management
costs, especially up front in the form of accountants and executive
training, and system transitioning. Implementation of the blockchain
could, at least initially translate in an additional layer of diversification
of the board. Indeed, while accountants may be tasked with the
mechanical registration on the ledger, the board should be aware of
the consequences of certain timing of transactions. However, these
costs do not seem justified given the high level of doubt surrounding
the effectiveness of blockchain for corporate governance purposes.
Accordingly, Bitcoin should not be used to record
transactions, specifically executive compensation, because of its still
unclear status and unstable nature. The blockchain technology behind
it instead may promote enhanced transparency. But this heightened
transparency may actually come at the detriment of shareholders,
especially in the case of inexperienced investors that may not be
familiar with typical corporate strategies and might misinterpret
perfectly innocent board decisions. Accordingly, given the limited
additional benefits of registration on public blockchain as compared
to the current disclosures required by the SEC, it is advisable the
blockchain too not be used, at least in this field.
B. Voting
Corporate elections, given diverse and spread ownership
structures, are commonly held through corporate proxy systems.
Currently, vote tabulation are subject to a considerable degree of
inaccuracy resulting in certain cases in the inability to verify the
question “who won?”158

Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate
Voting, GEORGETOWN L. J. 96, 1227, 1279 (2008). See also, A Call for Change in
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Studies have found that proxy voting, while solving the issue
of reaching quorums even though shareholders may be absent from
the voting meeting, has flaws such as inexact voter lists, incomplete
distribution of ballots, and problematic vote tabulation. 159
Implementation of blockchain could solve these issues given its
accuracy and reliability levels deriving from availability of copies of
ledgers to all users. In practice, voting via blockchain would be
achieved by allocating eligible voters tokens (also called “vote coins”)
in a number that represents their voting power. 160 Voters would then
transmit to addresses on the blockchain their vote, which would then
be registered on the ledger. 161
Additionally, implementation of blockchain voting may defeat
empty voting practices. Empty voting occurs when “an investor uses
borrowed shares or certain combinations of derivative securities to
acquire voting rights temporarily, without economic exposure to the
cash flow rights connected to a share.”162 These voting strategies
mostly rely on secrecy and, while legally doubtful, the difficulty
connected to their monitoring and enforcement continues to enable
them. Accordingly, a transparent system like shared ledger would
effectively render empty voting impossible.
However, empty voting is not necessarily a negative tool.
Supporters highlight the efficient effects of the strategy in that it
effectively permits pricing of voting rights according to the marginal
benefit attributed to the highest-valued voter.163 Empty voting is also
a great tool for minority shareholders in that it provides them with an
opportunity to maximize their profit by selling or temporarily renting
their voting rights.164 This view assumes that shareholders’ interests
the Proxy Advisory Industry Status Quo 50-61 (Ctr. on Exec. Compensation (White
Paper
c11-07b,
Jan.
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ProxyAdvisoryWhitePaper02
072011.pdf.
159 A Delaware attorney “estimates that, in a contest that is closer than 55
to 45%, there is no verifiab[ility]” of the election results. Kahan & Rock, supra note
158, at 1277-1281.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Yermack, supra note 154.
163 Id.
164 Id.
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are more focused on their profits per se than on actual active
participation in the decision making process of the company. Indeed,
whether empty voting is considered an acceptable practice also
depends on what level of shareholder participation in corporate
governance one believes appropriate.165
Opponents of empty voting, instead, point out the potential
undemocratic effect of disjoining ownership and voting rights, which
could, especially where it is the minority that rents or sells its voting
rights, turn against the very shareholders that are attempting to
benefit from the practice.166 Indeed, where minority shareholders
have, as it is common, opposite interests to the majority and control
shareholders, selling or renting their voting rights to those parties
may result in the support and passage of a resolution not in their best
interests.167 Accordingly, the benefit of empty voting is strongly based
on whether one considers shareholders’ interests to be those of
immediate profit making, or long term and active participation in
company governance.
Independently from how one views empty voting, given the
relatively straightforward use of the blockchain in the context of
voting, this could be an area in which the blockchain could be tested
for potential further implementation in governance. The removal and
independence of voting from share value avoids the evaluation issue
discussed above in the context of Bitcoin blockchains and could
render implementation of such model feasible too. In fact, the tokens
would be automatically assigned and would not be representative of
value. Thus, the analysis above regarding Bitcoin’s volatility would
not apply, rendering this specific use quite implementable even in the
regulatory status quo.168
Accordingly, voting via blockchain would effectively solve
ambiguities about election outcomes and thus reduce opportunities
to manipulate such results and would therefore be an advisable
corporate governance tool.
Onnig H. Bombalagian, Can Borrowing Shares Vindicate Shareholders
Primacy?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231, 1238-1257 (2009).
166 Yermack, supra note 137.
167 Id.
168 See supra Section II.
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C. Accounting
Commentators have suggested companies may successfully
transition to blockchain accounting and voluntarily post all their
ordinary business transactions on distributed ledgers. 169 This result
may be achieved both through use of Bitcoin as a means of exchange
for transactions or by reflecting the value of transactions via token
amounts using blockchain technology. However, neither method
implements a truly transparent system. Instead, both would allow for
managerial manipulation because of the value assessment issues
posed by Bitcoin and mentioned in Section III-A.
Implementation of blockchain accounting could reduce
accounting and auditing costs in that various units of a company
would be able to directly and centrally record transactions into the
ledger and thus there would be no need for an auditor to examine the
books of every unit to then assemble them ex post.170 Furthermore,
blockchain accounting would also lower the cost of auditing in that
auditors and governmental agencies would have direct access to the
ledger and be able to examine the regularity of transactions as they
occur. This system would thus require extended access to the ledger
by certain institutional players, such as taxing agencies, raising the
issue of who is entitled to access those records. Accordingly, the the
question of whose interests companies must pursue and what the
objectives of corporate governance are affect the resolution of this
issue. A possible solution to avoid overbroad access to confidential
records could be to grant access to only those market player that
would have access to SEC disclosures. However this could frustrate

Ryan Lazanis, How Technology Behind Bitcoin Could Transform Accounting as
We Know it, (Jan. 22, 2015), TECHVIBES, http://www.techvibes.com/blog/howtechnology-behind-bitcoin-could-transform-accounting-as- we-know-it-2015-01-22.
170 Oliver Staley, The Unsexy Future of Blockchain is Accounting, QUARTZ
(Mar. 3, 2016), http://qz.com/629662/the-unsexy-future-of-blockchain-isaccounting/; see, also, Blockchain Technology: A Game-changer in Accounting?,
DELOITTE,
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/de/Documents/Innovation/B
lockchain_A%20game-changer%20in%20accounting.pdf (last accessed May 10,
2016); Matthew Spoke, How Blockchain Tech will Change Auditing for Good,
COINDESK (July 11, 2015, 15:00), http://www.coindesk.com/blockchains-andthe-future-of-audit/.
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the very purpose of blockchain accounting by denying access to more
confidential information needed by taxing agencies.
Furthermore, commentators pushing for adoption of
blockchain accounting stress that this method would ensure complete
transparency as the entire ledger would be immediately visible,
assuming no restrictions to access are set by management, to all
stakeholders, from shareholders to creditors, and from lenders to
interested parties.171 While back-dating of transactions or amortizing
operation expenses over long periods is not feasible given the timestamped nature of the transaction blocks, forward dating can be
achieved by simply keeping a parallel undisclosed accounting
system.172 Indeed, parallel accounting, be it on a side ledger or in
paper form, would still offer companies an “under the table”
opportunity to circumvent reporting duties. Accordingly, this system
does not accomplish the result it purports to achieve: spotting and
impeding self-interested and fraudulent transactions.173 Indeed,
proponents of this type of accounting forget to take into account
human nature. They assume a perfect reality where voluntariness to
report all transactions at the moment they occur is the rule and selfinterests are nonexistent or not pursued. But how can a voluntary
reporting system ensure transparency in a system, especially in big
corporations, where ownership and management are quite separate?
Considering transition costs as well as the above-described pitfalls,
feasibility of blockchain accounting seems utopic and impracticable.
D. Smart Contracts
A smart contract is a “computerized protocol that executes
the terms of a contract.”174 Smart contracts are not a wholly new
concept, however, the advent of virtual currencies and Bitcoin have
offered a way to reinvent this transactional product. Given Bitcoin’s
rapid success among consumers, smart contract providers have

Yermack, supra note 154. See also, DELOITTE, supra note 170.
Id. at 17.
173 Id.
174 Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts, (1994) unpublished manuscript, available
at http://szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html.
171
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quickly developed and offer user-friendly interfaces.175 Accordingly,
consumers may engage in smart contracts that vary from easy daily
sales to substantive investments without going through traditional
intermediaries.
Technically speaking, the same concept at the basis of smart
contracts applies from daily tasks like operating a mechanical soda
machine to more sophisticated exchange market operations. The
premise on which a smart contract is based is assuring
performance. 176 Applicability of this mechanism to blockchain
technology translates in execution of contracts based upon the
occurrence or non-occurrence of specific verifiable events varying
from the passage of time to sophisticated contingencies such as
financial outcomes.177
While smart contracts may succeed and prove valuable to
private individuals’ where timing and certainty of execution are key,178
they may not prove successful as corporate governance tools. While
smart contracts may reduce agency costs associated with debt, they
would impose on corporations, and thus on boards, tight boundaries
for strategic actions. As one commentator noted, the willingness of a
company to enter into a smart contract in regard to a loan may be
limited as it “represents a pre-commitment not to behave
opportunistically in the future and it would protect a lender against
fraud strategies by a debtor such as pledging the same collateral to
two borrowers.”179 This effect may also prove legally unfeasible
considering directors’ fiduciary duties to shareholders as in the
context of hostile takeovers and relative Revlon duties.180

See, e.g., SMARTCONTRACT, http://about.smartcontract.com/#1naming-and-description.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Sue McLean & Simon Deane-John, Demystifying Blockchain and
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180 Revlon, Inc. v. Mecandrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
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Furthermore, the private nature of smart contract providers
and consequent access to bankruptcy mechanisms for those
providers, in addition to Bitcoin’s volatility, increases the risks of
market bubbles and chaos were some of the providers to fail
suddenly. Accordingly, however efficient, smart contract use does not
necessarily translate into corporate governance benefits warranting
the risks associated with committing to a set and irreversible course
of action (once a smart contract is active and the set occurrences
happen, execution is automatic). Accordingly, without prior
regulation of the status of smart contracts within the realm of
investment instruments, companies should not engage in such
transactions so as to better safeguard shareholders’ interests as well as
the overall company’s stability. Lastly, the complete automation of
execution overburdens companies’ boards, thus, without a possibility
to provide for “fiduciary out” mechanisms, smart contracts are not
an appropriate corporate governance tool and should be left to the
realm of private transactions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Bitcoin’s current under-regulated status and the lack of
confidence deriving from the absence of assurances derived from a
centralized bank and government backing, renders use of Bitcoin as a
corporate governance tool unjustifiably risky. However, the
distributed ledger technology of blockchains, as distinguished from
Bitcoin, can, in some fields, represent an efficient solution. During a
question-and-answer session with the Commonwealth Club Chair
George Scalise, Federal Reserve Chairwoman Yellen herself
recognized that, while Bitcoin is not within the scope the Federal
Reserve’s authority,
“[Blockchain] is a very important, new technology
that could have implications for the way in which
transactions are handled throughout the financial
system. We’re looking at it in terms of its promise in
some of the technologies we use ourselves and many
financial institutions are looking at it. It could make a
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big difference to the way in which transactions are
cleared and settled in the global economy.”181
Chairwoman Yellen has consistently pointed out that
“[blockchain] could have very significant implications for the
payment system and the conduct of business.”182 Although the
Federal Reserve is not currently exploring regulation, Yellen has
explained that the Federal Reserve is, importantly, “trying to
understand the nature” of fintech” and that she believes “innovation
using these technologies could be extremely helpful and bring
benefits to society.”183 Accordingly, regardless of political views and
affiliations, the blockchain represents an opportunity to be
pursued.184 Indeed, this article argues that blockchain technology is
more suited than Bitcoin to be implemented in the realm of
corporate governance because of its more reliable nature.
In regard to the registration of shares to enhance
transparency of ownership and shareholders’ confidence, neither
Bitcoin nor the blockchain would better the current situation. Indeed,
companies may implement closed side chains to hide, at least
temporarily, some transactions and thus defeat the goal of enhancing
the respective managing and monitoring roles of boards and
shareholders.185 Furthermore, in the case of Bitcoin, its volatile value
does not create trust in that transactions may be conveniently
recorded during low trading value so as to allow executives to pursue
self-interests and gain on the edge.186 Moreover, while the blockchain
may avoid this edging issue, potential shareholders’ panic may still be
a problematic consequence of complete transparency.187 Thus, while
companies could create diversified access levels by creating different
Stan Higgins, Fed Chair Yellen: Blockchain is an ‘Important Technology’,
COINDESK (Jan. 18, 2017 22:00), http://www.coindesk.com/fed-yellenblockchain-important-tech/.; For the full speech, see, Commonwealth Club, Federal
Reserve
Chair
Janet
Yellen,
YouTube
(Jan.
18,
2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ktBgb4xHKGY.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 See, above, part II(a) for Trump’s administration embracing attitude
towards Bitcoin and blockchain.
185 TASCA, supra note 73.
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keys, transparency, the very benefit that the technology purports to
achieve would be capped at the outset similar to the status quo.
Accordingly, implementation of either Bitcoin or the blockchain in
this area is not warranted, as it does not enhance the current status of
the SEC, and other similar, disclosures.
The arena of corporate voting is, instead, one where
implementation of distributed ledgers, and possibly Bitcoin, may
bring about a better corporate governance model. Indeed, in this
area, the actual market value of shares is unnecessary in the
computation of shareholders’ voting rights. 188 Accordingly, the time
stamping and accuracy level guaranteed by block chain technology
would probably bring about a better voting system. While use of
Bitcoin in this area does not pose the risks and issues it poses in areas
such as transaction reporting and accounting where value is key,
Bitcoin’s use should, at least until further regulation is enacted, be
paused in favor of block chain technology not using virtual
currencies.
Accounting represents the most problematic area in which
block chain or Bitcoin could be implemented within corporate
governance. Bitcoin’s volatile value is detrimental to implementation
in at least two ways. First, fluctuations in Bitcoin’s value may actually
further illegal and evasive acts of boards attempting to circumvent
accounting laws instead of encouraging transparent and truthful
accounting.189 Indeed, registering transactions at a later date would
permit, through exchange rates, modification of the actual value of a
company’s assets and liabilities.190 Second, and this applies to
blockchain generally as well, this system of accounting is based on
the false premise that boards are made of individuals perfectly able to
withhold self-interests.191 Instead, managerial evasion of shareholder
monitoring would still be possible, especially given the voluntary
blockchain reporting mechanisms. Also, implementation of such a
radically different method of accounting would result in great costs,
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thus, its relative benefits are not warranted, regardless of whether
Bitcoin of mere distributed ledgers are used.192
Lastly, while blockchain-based smart contracts represent an
interesting evolution in the area of self-executing contracts,
implementation in the corporate governance arena is not warranted
because of board’s fiduciary duties issues. This is so regardless of
whether the smart contract is based on Bitcoin currency, though in
that case, implementation would pose the added dangers deriving
from value volatility and lack of supporting infrastructure discussed
with regards to accounting.
Accordingly, because of its private and unpredictable nature
as well as its current under-regulation, Bitcoin does not present great
enough benefits to offset the risks deriving from its implementation.
This is so especially in the American market and economy, which do
not suffer from lack of consumer confidence in the national currency
like other currencies. Instead, the block chain can achieve a
progressively relevant status as a corporate governance tool.
Accordingly, this paper discourages, at least in the current regulatory
atmosphere, implementation of blockchain accounting and
ownership reporting but does support blockchain as a corporate
voting instrument aimed at ending empty voting and enhancing
accuracy.
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